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NOTES AND COMMENTS
sent of Justice Murrah0 2 There will undoubtedly be i great deal more
case law before the courts fully adopt or'reject either theory advanced
in Batten.
If the theory of nuisance is adopted without the necessity of a physical
trespass, the concepts originally passed on by the court in Causby will
have been broadened to an extent clearly not in the contemplation of the
Court.
In view of recent developments, airport authorities should consider
seriously development in wide open spaces, or be prepared to meet an
angry citizen who finds his home in need of repair, and his sleep inter.
rupted because the newest rage in air travel has just passed over his home.
Norman N. Pickett
CRIMINAL LAW: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMPRISONMENT OF
CHRONIC ALCOHOLICS FOR PUBLIS DRUNKENNESS.
On January 22, 1966, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Driver v.
Hinnant 1 ruled that no longer may a chronic alcoholic be prosecuted
under the public intoxication laws of the states located in the Fourth
Circuit. Such persons may be "detained", however, for treatment upon
a showing of a serious drinking problem. Although it is operative only
in the Fourth Circuit, the rule announced in Driver promises to have
sweeping implications on existing legal attitudes which heretofore have
considered the chronic alcoholic as little more than a petty criminal and
a nuisance to society.
The appellant, Joe B. Driver, is a classic example, of the chronic alco-
holic who often finds himself at odds with the law because he is 'unable
to limit the effects of his disease, namely intoxication, to places which the
law deems to be private, as opposed to public. Mr. Driver is fifty-nine
years of age and has been convicted more than 200 times for public
drunkenness. His first conviction occurred when he was twenty-nine.
Since that time, Mr. Driver has spent nearly two-thirds of his life in-
carcerated for violations of public intoxication laws. In response to the
charge against him, from which this decision ultimately resulted, Mr.
Driver admitted the truth of the allegations made pursuant to the lav4s
32 Martin v. Port of Seattle, supra note 24, at 546. "A careful reading of the
... cases leads this court to the condusion that the limitations inherent in the
common law concepts of trespass and ouster of possession, while highly useful in
some contexts, can rapidly become outmoded in dealing with current and evolving
space age sonic and supersonic phenomena."
I Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966y.
1966)
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of North Carolina,2 but defended on the theory that punishment of a
chronic alcoholic solely on the basis of his being found guilty of public
drunkenness would result in a "cruel and unusual punishment"3 under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. This con-
tention fell on deaf ears in the trial court 4 and his Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, testing the validity of the imprisonment ordered upon
his sentence, was denied.5
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court was called
upon to answer the question whether it is constitutional to convict a
chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness. In answering this question in
the negative, the court referred to the American Medical Association's
definition of a chronic alcoholic, set out in a publication prepared by the
National Institute of Mental Health 6: ". . . T]hose excessive drinkers
whose dependence on alcohol has attained such a degree that it shows a
noticeable disturbance or interference with their bodily or mental health,
their interpersonal relations, and their satisfactory social and economic
functioning.'"
The court went on to say that it accepted the idea that chronic alcohol
addiction "is now almost universally accepted as a disease," and stated:
Obviously, this includes appearances in public, as here, un-
willed and ungovernable by the victim when that is the con-
duct for which he is criminally accused, there can be no judg-
ment of criminal conviction passed upon him. To do so would
affront the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punish-
ment in branding him a criminal, irrespective of consequent
detention or fine.9
In summing up its decision the court remarked:
The upshot of our decision is that the state cannot stamp any
unpretending chronic alcoholic as a criminal if his drunken
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. 1 14-335 (1953) provides as follows: "If any person
shall be found drunk or intoxicated on the public highway, or at any public place
or meeting, in any county, township, city, town, village, or at any public place
named, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished
as it is provided in this section:
12 In ... Durham... Count[y) by a fine, for the first offense, of not
more than one hundred dollars ($100.00) or imprisonment for not more than sixty
days; for the second offense within a period of twelve months by a fine of not
more than one hundred ($100.00) or imprisonment for not more than sixty
days; and for the third offense within any twelve months period such offense is
declared a misdemeanor, punishable as a misdemeanor, within the discretion of
the court."3 Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
4 State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).5 Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. N.C. 1965).
6NATIONAL INSrITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T. op HEALT-.
DUC., & WELFARE, Alcoholism (Public Health Service Pub. No. 730, 1965).
7" Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 1, at 764.
8 Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 1, at 764 n.6.
9 Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 1, at 764.
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public display is involuntary as the result of disease. However,
nothing we have said precludes appropriate detention of him
for treatment and rehabilitation so ling as he is not marked as
a criminal.10
Obviously, this decision is applicable only to the chronic alcoholic and
does not apply to every person charged with public drunkenness. In other
words, the defendant must show the court that he is a chronic alcoholic,
incapable of voluntarily controlling his affliction. The significance of the
Driver decision is twofold. First, it is significant because it stands for the
proposition that the law is now ready to consider the chronic alcoholic as
a sick person, not a criminal. Secondly, it provides for a means of de-
tention and appropriate medical and psychiatric care for the chronic alco-
holic who, in the great majority of instances where he is sought to be
prosecuted for public drunkeness, is financially unable or unwilling to
provide such care for himself.
Most state laws dealing with public drunkenness are fairly uniform in
their provisions and are, for the most part, derived from legal philosophies
whose origins may be traced back to seventeenth century England."1 Okla-
homa, by statutory provision,' 2 classes the habitual drunkard as a vagrant.
A subsequent section of the same title provides that upon conviction for
violation of the statute the person is subject to fine or imprisonment or
both.14 The Oklahoma statutes are similar to other statutes throughout the
country. These laws are enacted for the purpose of protecting society from
the effects of indiscriminate public drunkenness. The problem with these
laws is not their validity as such, but in their overall application, since no
distinction is drawn between the first offender, who may or may not be
afflicted with a serious drinking problem, and the chronic alcoholic, who
is both mentally and physically incapable of governing the effects of his
affliction. With this in mind, a related problem should be noted: the
chronic alcoholic, most often prosecuted under public intoxication statutes,
is a member of society's subculture, with the results that he is more vul-
nerable to arrest than a person afflicted with the same condition from the
middle or upper strata of society. It has been pointed out in several
studies 'r that members of the middle and upper class society consider
arrest and criminal detention to be distasteful, to say the least, and would
view such phenomena with shame and abhorrence if either occurred to a
member of those classes.16 Members of the lower class society, on the
10 Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 1, at 765.
11MALTBiE, BANAY & BECON, Lectre 24, Penal Handling of Inebriates, in
ALCOHOL, SCIENCE AND Socinr 373 (1946).
12OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1141 (1961).
13 Campbell v. State, 31 Okla. Cr. 39, 237 Pac. 133 (1925).
14OKIA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1142 (1961).
'
5 HOLLINGSHEAD, BLMTOWNS YOUTH, (1949); PULMAN & GORDON,
REVOLVING DOOR, A STUDY OF THE CHRONIC POLICE CASE INEBRIATE,
(1958); WARNER, MEEKER & BELLS, SOCIAL CLASS IN AMERICA (1949).
16 PULmAN & GORDON, op. cit. supra note 15, at 41.
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other hand, do not. seem to possess similar attitudes, and, as a result, the
chronic alcoholic from this segment of society often finds himself involved
in a continuous pattern of arrest and incarceration for public drunkenness.
This pattern seemingly represents society's only solution to the problem
of public drunkenness and it has been aptly termed the "revolving door"
policy.1' Such a policy has been criticized because of the effect it tends
-to have on those "whose behavior in many cases is symptomatic of an
illness or disturbance in the personality... (but) ... societies accepted
manner of dealing with the public drunkard is to place him in the city
or county jail... along with other misdemeanants, where the frame work
*is one of repression instead of treatment."' 8
The rule announced in Driver v. Hinnant may represent a partial so-
lution to the problem. The United States Supreme Court in Robinson v.
California 19 recognized that a similar problem existed in the area of
narcotics addiction. There can be no doubt that Robinson was relied
upon to support the Driver decision. This was expressly stated by the
court when it remarked.
Robinson v. California..., sustains, if not commands, the view
we take, while occupied only with a state statute declaring drug
addiction to be a misdemeanor, the Court in the concurrences
and "dissents as well as the majority opinion, annunciated a
doctrine encompassing the present case.20
The Robinson case involved a defendant who was convicted pursuant
ito a California statute making it a criminal offense to be a narcotics
addict.2l The United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine
the constitutionality of. the state law under which the appellant was con-
victed. The Court held the statute to be uncontsitutional and stated:
It is unlikely that any state at this moment in history would
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally
ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A state
might determine that the general health and welfare require
that victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt with
* by compulsory treatments, involving quarantine, confinement,
or sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary human
knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a
disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an in-
17 PuLMAN & GoRDoN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1.18 PuLmAN & GoRaoN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 42.
19370 U.S. 1417 (1964).20 Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 1, at 764.2 1 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11721 (1964 provides in part as
follows: "No person shall use or be under the influence of, or be addicted to
the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a
person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be
.the burden of the defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any per-
son convicted of violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor
and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than
one year in the county jail....°'
(Vol. 3, No. 2
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fliction of cruel and inhuman punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments....22
The Court went on to say:
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract,
a punishment which is either cruel or unusual But the ques-
tion cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in
prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime'
of having a common cold....P
It should be noted that the statute involved in the Robinson case
is somewhat different from the statute under which appellant was con-
victed in the Driver case. The distinction is that the California statute
in the Robinson case made the "status" of narcotic addiction a crim-
inal offense, for which the offender could be criminally responsible until
he reformed. On the other hand, North Carolina's statute in the Driver
decision, as do other similar state statutes, provides that the gist of the
statutory violation only where the offender is "found drunk or intoxicated
on the public highway, or at any public place or meeting... .24
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the rule
announced in the Robinson case is equally applicable to the chronic alco-
holic. The Court may soon have the opportunity to make a ruling on
this point if it reviews the decision announced last April in Easter v.
District of Columbia.-" Here, the appellant was fifty-nine years of age.
He presented proof that he was a chronic alcoholic at the trial in which
he was sought to be prosecuted under a District of Columbia public
drunkenness statute.26 Easter had been a chronic alcoholic for over thirty
years and had some seventy public drunkenness convictions. He was con-
victed in the trial court and he predicated error on the refusal by the trial
judge to find him to be a chronic alcoholic and therefore a sick person.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals discussed the applicability of
the Rehabilitation of Alcoholics Act,2 7 but stated that this act did not
abrogate the common law rules regarding criminal responsibility of
chronic alcoholics nor conceal the prohibition by statute of drunkenness in
public." The court in discussing the problem of medical treatment of the
public drunkard stated:
No matter what might be our personal views and sympathies
in respect to the community alcoholic problem we are not au-
thorized under the law to solve it by ignoring the criminal
sanctions prescribed by 25 D.C. Code § 128. The alcoholic's
situation is the concern of all local residents, but appellant's
2 2 Robinson v. California, supra note 19, at 1420. (Footnote omitted)23 Robinson v. California, supra note 19, at 1421.24 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953).
26209 A.2d 625 (D.C. 1965).
26 D.C. CODE tit. 25 § 128 (a) (1961).2 TD.C. CODE tit. 24 §§ 501-14 (1961).
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